PROCESS-FOREIGN

PUBLISHING CORPORATION SUBJECT TO SUIT

IN CONNECTICUT FOR LIBEL; IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER
NEWS MEDIA HELD GOVERNED BY FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS OF PARTIES' AND PUBLIC'S INTERESTS AND NOT BY
THAT AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION TO "MINIMUM CONTACTS"
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.

Buckley v. New York

Post Corp. (2d Cir. 1967).
Alleging that the New York Post had published two newspaper
editorials maliciously and with reckless disregard of the truth, the
outspoken devotee of Conservatism, William F. Buckley, Jr., brought
action for libel in the superior court of Connecticut-his state of
domicile. Though the defendant, a Delaware corporation with its
principal business location in New York City, was in no way physically situate in the forum state, substituted service of process was
effected by mail in accordance with the Connecticut "long-arm"
statute. Answers to interrogatories later revealed that, on the days
the editorials had appeared, 2,021 copies of the Post's daily edition
and 2,026 copies of its weekend edition had been distributed by
various means to persons in Connecticut.Upon removal of the case to the federal district court, the Post
entered a motion for dismissal on the ground that Connecticut jurisdiction was lacking, subdivisions (3) and (4)2 of the "long-arm"
statute notwithstanding. The district court adjudged subdivision (3)
applicable, since it prescribes jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
in an action arising from the use or consumption of its goods within
the state. However, dismissal was granted on the theory that the
subdivision's application to the defendant would violate rights
1 The distribution was effected by wholesale agents, bus and mail shipments
consigned to dealers, and mail subscriptions. The figures in the text do not include
the "indeterminable" number of copies sold in New York with the expectation that
they would be taken into Connecticut by commuters returning from work.
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 599, § 33-411 (1961).
Service of process on foreign corporation....
(c) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by
a resident of this state or by a person having a usual place of business in
this state, whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in
interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:
- • (3) out of the production, manufacture or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that such goods are to be
used or consumed in this state and are so used or consumed, regardless of
how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed or sold
or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or dealers;
or (4) out of tortious conduct in this state, whether arising out of repeated
activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
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secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. On
appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed: Were
the case solely dependent upon subdivision (3), want of jurisdiction
would indeed necessitate dismissal; subdivision (4), on the other
hand, in permitting jurisdiction over a foreign corporation as a result
of "tortious conduct" within Connecticut, could validly be applied
without constitutional objection. Buckley v. New York Post Co., 373
F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
In Buckley-Post, after construing the state "long-arm" statute applicable to the defendant,3 the court proceeded to entertain the pri3 In confronting this problem, the court was concerned with the judicial interpretation of the Connecticut "long-arm" statute, and the application of the statute
in rapport with the single-publication rule.
In substituting subdivision (4) as the basis of jurisdiction, the court indicated that
the wording, "used or consumed," in subdivision (3) was scarcely expressive of
reading a newspaper. Although acknowledging that the raison d'Stre of subdivision (3)
lay in products liability actions, the lower court had believed that it would be "too
strained an interpretation" to differentiate between an instance where "a nail is
concealed in an unopened can of peas" and another where "defamatory words lie
dormant in an unread newspaper," since in either case no "cause of action arises until
some further act occurs." The appellate court, however, could not extend the analogy.
It was noted that, although the statutory wording could rationally be extended to
include reading, it would never include viewing a television or listening to a radio.
Consequently, it was held judicially inconsistent to interpret from the subdivision
a grant of jurisdiction over publishers of newspapers or magazines, but not over broadcasting companies. 373 F.2d at 177-78.
The court justified the application of subdivision (4) by noting that the ordinary
denotation of the phrase, "tortious conduct in this state," could not exclude the
distribution of two thousand copies of libel. Even though the "last event" approach,
which situates the place of wrong where the defamation is communicated, has been
stigmatized as an unsound basis for choice of law, its influence upon the Connecticut
legislature was not considered vitiated to the extent that libel would be disregarded
as tortious activity. 373 F.2d at 178-79.
This apt interpretation, giving efficacy in the instant facts to the Connecticut
statute, was, however, asserted by the defendant to be nugatory. Invoking the rationale
of Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 632-34 (N.D. I1l.),
aff'd 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960), the Post
averred that the single-publication rule compelled the abandonment of the literal
statutory meaning. In Insull, the cause of action for libel was held implicitly complete
at the initial publication of the newspaper. Since the publication had occurred outside
Illinois, the plaintiff's domicile and forum of the action, the subsequent distribution
of the newspaper in that state by independent wholesalers was held inconsequential to
the creation of the cause of action. Therefore, jurisdiction could not attach to the defendants because no tortious activity had taken place within Illinois.
Although advocated by the Post, a rationale analogous to Insull was not adopted
in Buckley-Post. A recent Illinois decision, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), which broadly construed the
Illinois "long-arm" statute, was cited by the court as casting doubt on Insull's present
applicability. In Gray, the cause of action arose from the explosion of a water heater
with a defective safety valve. The manufacturer of the valve contended that because
the wrong had not originated in Illinois, arising instead from the acts performed in
the state of production, jurisdiction could not attach to it. The argument was that,
by using the term "tortious conduct" and not "tort," the Illinois legislature intended
to separate the act or conduct from any consequences thereof, with only the former
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mary issue whether due process would be denied the Post in holding
it amenable to suit in Connecticut.
At common law, the corporate entity was judicially envisaged as
existing only within the state of creation. 4 Accordingly, it was held
that an action in personam could not be maintained outside the
creating state's jurisdiction, for extraterritorially the corporation was
not merely considered foreign, but nonexistent. 5 This strict conception was, however, quicdy modified. Since the corporate form was
becoming the primary conduit of business activity throughout the
nation, courts began to realize that it should be amenable to suit in
jurisdictions other than that of incorporation. 6 In addition to finding
a valid basis of jurisdiction in express consent-either actual or imposed by statute as a prerequisite to engaging in business within the
state 7 -courts developed three formulae to determine amenability to
suit: implied consent to the jurisdiction, presence within the forum
state, and "doing business" therein. Ultimately, the formulae merged,
with "doing business" becoming the general test in jurisdictional
problems.8
being within the purview of the "long-arm" statute. The Gray court rejected this
contention, holding that its adoption would only tend to promote litigation over
extraneous issues, such as the elements of a tort and their territorial aspects. The test
in applying the statute was thought to "be concerned more with those substantial
elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature." Id.
at 763.
Prompted by Gray and the lack of Connecticut cases upholding the Insull doctrine,
the Buckley-Post court failed to heed Insull in interpreting Connecticut law. Although
the single-publication rule has not been adopted in Connecticut, the court agreed with
earlier judicial predictions that its adoption was forthcoming. Nevertheless, it noted
that only aberrant reasoning would permit the single-publication rule to spare a newspaper or magazine publisher from the reach of a "long-arm" statute. The purpose of
the rule was not to deny the plaintiff the prerogative of suing in his domiciliary state
when defamed by a party residing beyond its jurisdiction; rather, it was established
"to protect the defendant-and the courts-from a multiplicity of suits, an almost
endless tolling of the statute of limitations, and diversity in applicable substantive

law." 373 F.2d at 179-80. However, it was held that this protection should not be
afforded with indifference to the rights of the plaintiff, thereby permitting the singlepublication rule to nullify libel circulating outside the situs of its original publication.
A further authority serving to eviscerate the Post's contention was Mattox v. News
Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949), a Second
Circuit decision in which, albeit the initial publication had taken place in New York,
the substantive law of plaintiff's domicile, Virginia, was deemed controlling. Apparently,
had a tort not been recognized as occurring in Virginia, its substantive law would
have been inapplicable under conflict-of-laws prinicples.
4 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
5 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33, at 111 (1962).

6 Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and ;he in Personam jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 569, 578 (1958).
7 EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 111.
8 Kurland, supra note 6, at 578; see D. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm:

Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533.
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These formulae, moreover, became necessary in order to gain
jurisdiction over the corporate "person" in compliance with principle exposited in Pennoyer v. Neff.' With the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that in state courts,
whereas personal service was not imperative in actions in rem, actions
in personam required service of process on a defendant physically
present within the forum state. The oft-quoted pronouncement read:
[W]here the entire object of the action is to determine the
personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that is, where
the suit is merely in personam, constructive service... upon a nonresident is ineffectual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals
of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties
there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings
against them. Publication of process or notice within the State where
the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the nonresident to appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and
process published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to
establish his personal liability. 10
But in Buckley-Post it was noted that "[t] he past fifty years have seen
such widespread adoption of statutes asserting personal jurisdiction
over non-residents and so many decisions upholding their constitutionality as to constitute a veritable bouleversement of [this] magisterial pronouncement . . . ."" This "reversal" has permittted plaintiffs, in cases similar to Buckley-Post, to bring suit in their own fora
through constructive or substituted service of process, thus sounding
a requiem for the bias which had formerly favored defendants in the
12
area of in personam jurisdiction.
A landmark decision contributing to this demise was International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,'3 in which the Supreme Court replaced the
"doing business" test with the following criterion: If a defendant
were not present within the territory of the forum, the only mandate
of due process in an action in personam would be that he have certain "minimum contacts" with it, "such that the maintenance of the
suit [would] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-

9 95

U.S. 714 (1878).
at 727.
31 373 F.2d at 180-81.
12 Id. at 181. See Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 Huv. L. Rav. 1121, 1128 (1966). See also D. Currie, supra note 8,

:o Id.

at 553-54; Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr.
REv. 241.
'3

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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stantial justice.' "14 A later Supreme Court holding, McGee v. Inter-

national Life Ins. Co.,'- in implementing InternationalShoe, well
illustrated the liberality of the "minimum contacts" criterion. Although, in McGee, the defendant's only "contacts" with the forum
state had been the sending of an insurance policy to one of its residents and the receiving of paid premiums via return mail, the court
determined that the "minimum contacts" had been demonstrated; the
due process requirement, therefore, was deemed satisfied.
The Buckley- Post court, though readily acknowledging that certain
language in McGee underscored considerations peculiar to insurance,
reasoned that a general principle could be drawn from its opinion
which would permit states to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents
without impinging on rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."0 It was noted that inequities, discordant with the principle of
due process, would only appear in situations where the defendant was
subject to the jurisdiction of a forum with which he was not relevantly
connected.17 Since a wholly isolated event giving rise to a tort can
comprise this connection, 1 8 the court perceived "no constitutional
problem in Connecticut's summoning the New York Post to answer
in its courts for a tort-otherthan defamation-allegedto have been
14 Id. at 316. The new criterion did not completely eliminate the older test, however,
as courts continued to ascertain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation by inquiring
whether it was "doing business" within the forum state. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1202,
1203 (1952).
15 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
16 The court expressed the opinion that, once the traditional notion that the plaintiff must follow the defendant was forsaken, this general principle would not appear
violative of basic concepts of fair play. Contrary views would be bottomed on an
inarticulate premise, subject to question by the legislature, that plaintiffs are more
susceptible to bringing unjust actions than defendants are to avoiding just ones.
"Indeed, when the operative facts have occurred where the plaintiff sues, the convenience of both parties would often be served by a trial there, and the chief benefit
to the defendant of a rule requiring the plaintiff to seek him out is the impediment
this creates to the bringing of any suit at all." 373 F.2d at 181; cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
17 D. Currie, supra note 8, at 534.
18 See Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956);
Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960);
Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 830, 345 P.2d 921, 924 (1959); Nelson
v. Miller, 11 II. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); S.Howes Co. v. W.P. Milling Co.,
277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569,
80 A.2d 664 (1951). Contra, Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96
S.E.2d 445 (1957).
Although in many of the cases cited before Putnam the defendant or his agent had
been within the forum state, the Buckley-Post court did not find this decisive. See
St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966); D. Currie, supra note 8,
at 549.
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committed in Connecticut upon a Connecticut resident .... , The
court temporarily excluded defamation from this conclusion so that
an analysis could be made of recent southern decisions, notably New
York Times Co. v. Connor,20 which have held that, because of first
amendment considerations, a more substantial contact must be evidenced in libel actions than would be necessary in other tort cases.
Oddly enough, the Connor court failed to state what would be a
constitutionally sufficient contact. Written in the negative, the opinion
merely indicated that a daily newspaper circulation of 395 copies and
a Sunday total of 2,455, coupled with certain business solicitation and
personnel visits in the forum state, had not met the "minimum contacts" test. In view of the fact that a Connor precedent, the 1964
decision of Buckley v. New York Times Co.,21 was equally uninformative, the only normative principle which the Buckley-Post court
could extract after a perusal of these opinions was that jurisdiction
cannot be asserted consistently with due process when a small newspaper circulation in the forum state is outweighed by the foreign
corporation's having to face a local, prejudiced jury.22
Although propounding a contrary thesis, the court eschewed a
critique of the Connor holding.23 Instead, a different approach was
pursued. The development of substantive principles under the first
amendment, it was noted, have recently tempered the risks to which
19
20
21
22

373 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966). The state-

ment in Connor reads: "where the size of . . . circulation does not balance the
danger of . . . liability." But the Buckley-Post court noted that this statement did
not mean liability as such, but meant the added danger of facing the local jury,
incensed because of the newspaper's slanted coverage of local events.
In Connor, the Fifth Circuit was confronted with seemingly inconsistent precedents.
The court had held in Buckley, a case with facts similar to those before it, that sufficient
contact had not been shown, while in Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke,
343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965), it had ruled that tortious damage caused by a single
airplane crash had been within the fourteenth amendment requirement. The two were
reconciled, nonetheless, by applying the first amendment principle. The Connor court
noted that it had earlier approved of such a first amendment application in Walker
v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1964), "because of the inherent danger or
threat to the free exercise of the right of freedom of the press if jurisdiction in every
state can be inferred from minimal contacts."
23 The court, however, deemed the Connor reasoning dubious as applied to other
factual situations. Like other entrepreneurs who inflict harm in providing services
beneficial to the public, publishers must compensate those whom they have injured.
Credence, therefore, could never be given to the decision if the plaintiff had been a
highly respected educator or clergyman rather than "Bull" Connor, and, instead of
the New York Times-a newspaper of ethical repute-the defendant had been a
scandal magazine which had published libelous articles depicting the hypothetical
plaintiff as a corruptor of children. 373 F.2d at 182.
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publishers are exposed in libel actions. A significant case in this
development, New York Times v. Sullivan,24 outlined these principles. In an action to recover general damages for circulating an advertisement which had attacked a public official's conduct, the Supreme
Court declared a state-authorized presumption of malice inconsistent
with federal law. In such cases, the Court ruled, constitutional guarantees demand proof of "actual malice." Since "actual malice" was
defined as "knowledge" of the publication's falsity or "reckless disregard" of its truthfulness, factual inaccuracies and defamatory
content resulting from negligence in publishing were held insufficient
to award general damages. While Sullivan was limited to public
officials, an extension, so as to include candidates for public office and
publicly controversial figures, was subsequently suggested by the
Second Circuit,26 and successfully employed as a defense in another
action.27 In light of Sullivan and the later extension, the Buckley-Post
court queried whether these substantive aspects would not "sufficiently
protect communications media without superimposing a necessarily
vague First Amendment standard upon the application of long-arm
statutes and thereby possibly creating undue hardship for a plaintiff ..
*"28 It was observed that, ironically, the Connor opinion
answered this query affirmatively. After determining that jurisdiction
could not constitutionally be imposed, the Connor court considered
the merits of the case, and exonerated the defendant because the
facts were admittedly governed by the doctrine enunciated in Sulli9
van.2
In conclusion, the Buckley-Post court conceded that procedural
rules as well as substantive defenses may be necessary to protect
foreign publishing corporations. Yet these rules, in eliminating
onerous trials and appeals, would not find their basis in jurisdiction
under the fourteenth amendment itself, but in the states' exercise of
jurisdiction pursuant to the first amendment's objectives. Appropriate
dismissals would therefore result from first amendment considerations made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment and not from failures to meet the "minimum contacts" require24 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25 Id. at 280; accord, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). It is interesting

to note that the plaintiff in the instant case used this "actual malice" terminology in
his pleading.
26 Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964).
27 Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966).
28 373 F.2d at 182-83.
29 New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[V

[Vol. 4

ment of the due process clause.30 This approach would parallel that
taken by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with the commerce
clause. In Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 1 the Court reversed a
Minnesota judgment against a director of a foreign railroad corporation in a suit arising from a transaction totally unrelated to the forum
state. Compelling a party to defend in such a situation was termed
an undue burden on interstate commerce and, consequently, "obnoxious" to the constitution, irrespective of jurisdiction under the
fourteenth amendment. Scrupulously preserved in later Supreme
Court opinions, 2 this distinction, if applied to libel actions involving
the news media, would focus "attention on the facts allegedly creating hardship in each case... ,,,3 rather than impose a jurisdictional
due process fiat mechanically applying to even the most diverse facts.
In other words, in such libel actions courts could refuse to exercise
jurisdiction when the facts revealed that a different forum was
necessary. Thus, the first amendment would give the doctrine of
forum non conveniens constitutional stature; and courts, pursuant to
the dictates of this equitable doctrine, would consider the interests of
the public and the parties involved in determining the proper forum.
In view of the parties' interests in Buckley-Post, the court could discern no first amendment abridgment in subjecting the Post to Connecticut jurisdiction. Whereas the New York Times, in the Connor
and Buckley cases, might well have ceased distribution in the southern
states in lieu of facing repeated libel actions in those distant fora, it
did not appear, in the principal case, that the Post would forego
revenue from Connecticut sales and thus deprive Connecticut readers
of its news and editorials, rather than defend a suit in that forum, a
few miles from New York. 4
30 See New York Times Co. v. Connor, supra note 29, at 572.
31 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
32

E.g., Michigan Central R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929); Hoffman v. Missouri

ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21 (1927); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor,

266 U.S. 200 (1924); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101
(1924); see Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932).
33 373 F.2d at 183. The distinction, the court stated, would be far more equitable
than a stringent rule of jurisdiction which indiscriminately precludes a plaintiff from
bringing suit in his own jurisdiction whether the publicaton occurred twenty-five miles
or twenty-five hundred miles from the forum.
34 Further, the court could not overlook the two states' economic and intellectual
affinity. The mere existence of their mutual border, it was held, should not prevent,
by virtue of the first amendment, a libel action against the Post in a Connecticut court
when the defendant is amenable to suit for libel in Buffalo or Skaneateles, New York.
A contrary view would only substitute formalism for the realistic approach which
ought to be taken before the first amendment bars a forum from exercising jurisdiction
over a domiciliary of another state. 373 F.2d at 184.
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Although somewhat cryptically explained, the Buckley-Post analysis of the roles of the first and fourteenth amendments, in the area of
libel and the "long-arm" statute, appears to be sound. The court, by
drawing from analogous cases concerned with the commerce clause
and by synthesizing the Sullivan and Connor decisions, has indeed
established a tenable doctrine. Should Buckley-Post be followed,
courts would protect the news media, insure the continuance of news
dissemination, and, at the same time, eliminate jurisdictional barriers
precluding plaintiffs from suing in their own fora.
By focusing on the substantive defenses outlined in Sullivan, the
court has retained the first amendment protections which are vitally
needed by the communications media, while obviating a strict, illdefined jurisdictional due process norm which, as seen in Connor and
Buckley, might inequitably allow libel to circulate in a foreign state
without redress. Thus it would seem that the first amendment's
function has been correctly interpreted: This constitutional provision
should not bar the maintenance of a libel suit by requiring a more
substantial showing of "minimum contracts" to satisfy the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment; on the contrary, the protection
of the freedom of the press ought to come into play after jurisdiction
has been established. It would be inconsistent with the notion of
"fair play and substantial justice" to prevent an action, when in
litigation the substantive test of "actual malice" would balance the
need for redressing libel against the constitutional safeguards surrounding the news media.
The Buckley-Post doctrine would not, however, completely eliminate jurisdictional protection. The elevation of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens to constitutional stature would warrant an equitable
decision in each case. If the application of a "long-arm" statute to a
foreign publishing corporation would create a possible discontinuance
of its newspaper's distribution in the forum state, and thus a possible
abridgment of the first amendment, a different forum could be sought.
The idea of basing jurisdiction upon the interests involved in a
libel suit, i.e., upon basic notions of fairness, is not without support.
Professor Ehrenzweig notes that California has determined jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a warranty action by considering
"whether there is afforded to both parties a greater amount of justice
by allowing suit in [California] rather than elsewhere. '3 5 Indeed the
35 Fielding v. Superior Court, ill Cal. App. 2d 490, 496, 244 P.2d 968, 972,
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 5, at 118.

cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952), quoted in
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McGee decision appears in accord. 8 Furthermore, Professor Ehrenzweig writes, an impetus has been given to the constitutional freedom
of state legislatures and courts in subjecting foreign corporations to
jurisdiction. As the earlier tests have been replaced by the International Shoe and McGee concepts of fairness, so too will these result
in the acceptance of Learned Hand's simple formula:
[T]he court must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e.,
whether the gain to the plaintiff, in retaining the action where it
was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant; or vice
versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of
' 7
"forum non conveniens."

The Buckley-Post court has doubtless accepted that formula.
MICHAEL RANDALL ROGERS
36 The McGee court noted that the defendant corporation would be inconvenienced
by being amenable to suit in the forum state but held that this inconvenience would
not amount to a denial of due process. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 224 (1957).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
held that "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 253. But Justice
Black, in his dissent, viewed the majority's opinion as stemming from the antiquated
principles of Pennoyer. Citing McGee, he stated that "the old jurisdictional landmarks
have been left far behind so that in many instances States may now properly exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents ....

" Id. at 260.

Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 814 (1948), quoted in EHnRENzwaxo, supra note 5, at 118.
37

